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Abstract
This study aims to explore the social roles of the people who can influence young home computer users
(HCUs) in Vietnam, as well as the interactions that make those people influential. Since HCUs are
considered the weakest link in the security chain and cyber-threats can attack organisation’s information
systems indirectly via these HCUs, it is therefore necessary to identify their sources of security influence
for designing effective intervention. To this end, the ego-centric network analysis approach was
employed to analyse the personal networks of security influence of 116 HCUs, comprising 548 influential
sources in total. Close relationships such as family members, partners, friends, and colleagues were
predominantly nominated as capable of influencing HCUs’ security behaviours. Furthermore, these
sources influence the HCUs by possessing the power bases of expert, reward, and coercive, as well as
holding legitimate positions that make them influential.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the use of Internet is becoming more ubiquitous, home computer users are also exposed more to
security and privacy threats (Kritzinger and Von Solms 2010). Home computer users (HCUs) can be
defined as individual end-users who use the Internet at non-work locations and for personal purposes.
As such, they are responsible for their own cyber-safety (Kritzinger and Von Solms 2010) and not
protected by sophisticated protection, such as advanced firewall and professional IT supports, that
would be usually implemented in work contexts. Moreover, it has been widely agreed that not all HCUs
possess appropriate awareness of information security issues due to the lack of formal training (Howe
et al. 2012; Kritzinger and Von Solms 2010). Without proper security awareness and protection, HCUs
are extremely vulnerable to information security and privacy threats (Kritzinger and Von Solms 2010;
Li and Siponen 2011).
Modern organisations cannot simply ignore the vulnerabilities of these HCUs, since their vulnerabilities
and mistakes when using the Internet at non-work contexts can result in significant collateral damage
(Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Dinev et al. 2009; Li and Siponen 2011; Liang and Xue 2010). This is due
to the trending adoption of Bring-Your-Own-Device practice by many organisations that allow their
employees to use personal devices (e.g. smartphones and laptops) for work purposes and bring work
home, including confidential data (Dang et al. 2013; Liang and Xue 2010). As a result, careless Internet
uses on the personal devices might have them infected by computer viruses that can steal or destroy the
confidential data stored on these devices (Dang et al. 2013; Li and Siponen 2011; Liang and Xue 2010).
Improving HCUs’ security awareness and their security behaviours appears to be the solution to
compensate the lack of adequate technological protection and mitigate the cyber threats (Dinev et al.
2009; Li and Siponen 2011). To this end, prior studies have identified the contributing factors that
influence the HCUs’ security behaviours by empirically tested psychological and behavioural theories
(e.g. Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Lee et al., 2008; Zhang and McDowell, 2009). However, the number
of studies focusing on end-users’ information security at home remains overshadowed by those
investigating the organisational context (Liang and Xue 2010). Furthermore, research adopting the
traditional approach to investigate individualistic end-users overlooks the environmental catalysts that
enable the positive effects on security behaviours that were identified by previous studies, thus limits
the opportunities to develop effective interventions (Dang-Pham et al. 2014).
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, we employ social network analysis methods as a novel
approach in the behavioural security field to examine the HCUs’ personal networks that influence their
security awareness and behaviours. As a result, this demonstrates the use of the ego-centric network
research approach and provides directions for future studies. Second, we determine the specific types of
interactions and social roles of these influential sources, from which practical recommendations about
choosing the influential means to enhance HCUs’ security awareness can be drawn. Ultimately, we aim
to answer the following questions:
•

RQ1: Who does influence home computer users’ (HCUs) information security behaviours?

•

RQ2: What are the interactions that make a person influential in information security?

2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Related work
Even though personal information security behaviours hold important roles in the whole security chain,
the number of studies focusing on this research area remains overshadowed by those about workplace’s
security (Liang and Xue 2010). Amongst the HCUs’ information security literature, a majority of them
investigates the contributing factors that impact the HCUs’ cognitive process that governs their security
behaviours. For instance, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found HCUs’ concerns about security threats
and self-efficacy can contribute to a positive attitude about personal security behaviours, which
subsequently motivates the intention to perform the behaviours, together with other factors such as
subjective norm and psychological ownership over own computer and the Internet. Similarly, Lee et al.
(2008) and Liang and Xue (2010) found intention to perform personal security behaviours is motivated
by the HCUs’ perceptions of the security threats and coping measures, such as how much they feel
vulnerable against the threats and how efficient the security practices could protect them from such
threats. Most recently, (Dang et al. 2013) also found higher education students intend to perform BYODrelated security behaviours as they assess characteristics of the cyber-threats and security practices.
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There is a growing number of recent behavioural security research focusing on the impacts of the
security environment on security behaviours, which include the sources of security advice and influence.
For instance, Warkentin et al. (2011) found a positive link between the employee’s self-efficacy in
information security and their access to learning sources such as situational support, verbal persuasion,
and vicarious experience gained from job shadowing. Ifinedo (2014) found employees socialising with
their colleagues can develop four types of bonds, which increase their perception of subjective norms
and subsequently intention to comply with security policy. Likewise, in the other side of behavioural
security research, various studies started to address the association between the workplace’s features
and the employee’s tendency to commit malicious security behaviours. Examples of this trend include
the extension of the Security Action Cycle which adds the “kinetic events” component (Willison and
Warkentin 2013), and the research models that explain how work stress and perceived organisational
injustice might lead to security violation (Dang 2014; Posey et al. 2011). In line with the increasing focus
on the impacts of the security environment, Dang-Pham et al. (2014) proposed the use of social network
analysis techniques to analyse the diffusion of malicious security behaviours in the workplace.
Several studies that aimed to identify the personal sources of HCUs’ information security have been
conducted primarily in Western contexts. For instance, Furnell et al. (2007) surveyed the population of
UK residents about their information security awareness, and found a majority of them seek security
advice from their friends, public websites, and IT professionals. Similarly, the sample of undergraduate
students in the study of Aytes and Connolly (2004) reported to rely on friends and co-workers’ security
advice when making information security-related decisions, whereas half of this sample did not have
any sources of advice. Furthermore, the recent literature review by Howe et al. (2012) revealed that the
number of studies about the sources of information security advice remains limited and has not been
updated since 10 years ago. While the important factors that positively influence HCUs’ information
security decision-making have been determined, there are fewer studies that address the sources of
those factors. Without the knowledge of the catalysts that effectively deliver the contributing factors, it
is challenging to design and conduct intervention and measures to practically improve HCUs’
information security behaviours. Therefore, determining these sources of information security influence
and advice becomes a crucial task (Howe et al. 2012).

2.2 Motivations and theoretical background
Our research objective about determining the sources of information security influence is similar to the
concept of social capital. Social capital is a concept that has been studied widely in the sociology field,
and its findings have informed studies about individual’s behaviours, education, public health, economic
development, and information systems, just to name a few (Adler and Kwon 2002). Across the different
definitions of social capital, we found the external view of social capital most relevant and useful for
guiding our study. This external view defines social capital as the links to actors and resources in a
personal network that facilitate and explain the differential success amongst individuals (Adler and
Kwon 2002). The salient social roles of network actors (e.g. acquaintances, friends, or family members)
and the types of supports or resources provided by them are both core interests to social capital
researchers (Borgatti et al. 2009, 2013). As such, prior studies determined the HCUs’ sources of security
influence have only revealed the social roles of the sources, while the interactions that result in such
influence remain unexplored. In this research, we attempt to investigate further the types of interactions
associated with the salient social roles, which influence the HCUs’ security behaviours.
We rely on French and Raven's (1959) seminal theory of power bases to design our questionnaire and
explore the potential types of interactions that make a person appear influential in information security
to another. The updated version of this theory (Raven 2008) suggested that there are six types of
influential power, including (1) informational, (2) reward, (3) coercive, (4) legitimate, (5) expert, and
(6) referent power bases. Informational and expert types of power are similar in that a person can
influence others through explaining them with persuasive reasoning (informational), or appear as
possessing superior insights that the influenced agents put their faith into (expert) (Raven 2008).
Provided that information security is often perceived as a technical area (Dang-Pham et al. 2014) and
activities related to seeking security advice from knowledgeable colleagues have been documented by
prior researches (e.g. Dourish et al. 2004; Warkentin et al. 2011; Wash 2010), we include the interactions
related to teaching, explaining, and troubleshooting security in our questionnaire.
Reward and coercive power types that make a person influential are rather self-explanatory. However,
it is worth elaborating that rewards and sanctions can be intangible (i.e. social) or tangible (e.g. money).
For instance, sanctions have been consistently confirmed an important deterrence of security violations
in the workplace context (Sommestad et al. 2014). Furthermore, Guo and Yuan (2012) found
organisational sanctions fail to directly influence the employees’ intention to violate security policy but
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indirectly via workgroup and personal sanctions. In contrast, the effects of tangible and intangible
rewards on security compliance still have inconsistent results (Dang et al. 2013; Siponen et al. 2014;
Vance et al. 2012). Given these important effects of rewards and sanctions on information security
behaviours, we also include them in our questionnaire.
Last but not least, individuals holding legitimate and referent positions can be influential to others
(Raven 2008). Referent power involves the influential person is seen by the influenced agents as a role
model, whom they admire and want to emulate beliefs and behaviours (Raven 2008). Such power could
be caused by the social roles that the influential person holds, such as being a senior colleague at work
or an elder family member. On the other hand, a person’s legitimate status can be dictated by default by
social norms and structures, or stem from the influenced agent’s obligation to assist a helpless person
or reciprocate a past favour (Raven 2008). Such dependent relationship can take place when a person
feels the need to protect another’s information security, such as exercising care when using the Internet
at home to prevent the risk of virus infection in the home network (Dang et al. 2013; Li and Siponen
2011). Furthermore, there are more people co-sharing data and having access to another’s data thanks
to the rapid adoption of personal cloud storage. This subsequently results in the obligation to protect
others’ confidential data and also one own when co-sharing storage, especially when psychological
ownership over personal computer and the Internet was confirmed as an influential factor of HCUs’
security behaviours (Anderson and Agarwal 2010). As a consequence, we include these interactions in
our questionnaire.

3 RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Exploratory ego-centric network research approach
Despite its wide applications in other organisational behavioural fields, the use of social network
analysis (SNA) approach in behavioural security field is still new (Dang-Pham et al. 2014). SNA methods
are different from the traditional approach in that their main unit of analysis is the interactions and
relationships between network actors, rather than their individualistic attributes (Otte and Rousseau
2002). As such, network researchers capitalise on this methodological feature and employ unique
techniques to analyse the relational data and explore more in depth the environmental factors (DangPham et al. 2014; Otte and Rousseau 2002). Network research primarily follows whole-network and
ego-centric network research designs, between which the former has a boundary defined by the
researchers (Borgatti et al. 2013). For instance, whole-network research might attempt to study the
interactions and relationships between employees of the same organisation, whereas ego-centric
network can be conducted by employing random sampling technique to collect data from a general
population (Borgatti et al. 2013).
In addition to the fundamental concepts of nodes (i.e. network actors) and ties (i.e. the links between
the actors), ego-centric network research focuses on analysing the personal networks of individual focal
nodes (i.e. egos) and their neighbours (i.e. alters) (Borgatti et al. 2013). In fact, ego-centric network
research contributes to the important concept of social capital, which refers to the link between one’s
possession of network resources such as social supports and their outcomes (Adler and Kwon 2002;
Borgatti et al. 1998, 2009). Since our research questions focus on the sources of information security
influence on the young HCUs’ security behaviours, ego-centric network research is appropriate for such
objectives.

3.2 Research context and data collection
As mentioned in the title of the research, our research is set in Vietnam–a developing country in South
East Asia. Vietnam is currently ranked 13th in the world in terms of Internet penetration, with 52 per
cent of the country’s population are Internet users (Internet Live Stats 2016). However, the information
security landscape in Vietnam has not yet reached its maturity. For instance, only 30 per cent of
companies in Vietnam were found to have information security policies and measures in place (Vietnam
MIC 2014). Worse still, Vietnam was ranked amongst the top five countries in the world where Internet
users are threatned by computer viruses (Kaspersky 2014). As a result, there is an urgent need for
identifying the sources of influence of HCUs’ security behaviours and improving their awareness.
We designed our questionnaire to capture the salient social roles and security interactions identified in
the literature review. The Vietnamese questionnaire was advertised on social media platforms such as
Facebook and LinkedIn for three months to collect data from the general population. Besides capturing
the ego’s demographics (e.g. age and gender), the questionnaire asked the egos to nominate maximum
seven people (alters) who can influence their information security behaviours. After the participants list
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out the alters who can influence their information security behaviours, 19 probing questions verify the
social roles (e.g. partner, family, friend, or colleague) and the security interactions that make them
influential to the egos (e.g. teach security, share data with ego, or reward ego for security effort).
The limit of maximum seven nominations per ego was set as we believe it could help to significantly
reduce the participants’ stress in answering the questionnaire. This is due to each nominated alter has a
set of 19 questions that aim to elaborate further the alters’ social roles and interactions with the egos.
Should we ask to nominate more than seven alters, the number of subsequent questions increases
exponentially with the participants’ stress. Furthermore, an empirical study conducted by Merluzzi and
Burt (2013) suggested that five names would be sufficient for meaningful network analyses.

4 ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
4.1 Egos and alters’ demographics
Our collected sample of 116 egos is young (mean age=23.84 years old; SD=4.532). The ratio of male and
female respondents are considered balanced (male=47.4 per cent; female=52.6 per cent), which a
majority of them rated their IT proficiency to be “intermediate” (49.1 per cent), followed by “advanced”
(23.3 per cent), “novice” (22.4 per cent), and “expert” (5.2 per cent). These young HCUs tend to have
their confidential data stored in personal computers (75.9 per cent), cloud storage (62.9 per cent),
smartphones (60.3 per cent), USBs and portable drives (44.8 per cent), and social media such as
Facebook (36.2 per cent). It is also interesting to find that personal cloud storage was considered the
young HCUs’ second popular choice for storing confidential data.
There is a total of 548 alters (or security influencers) who were nominated by our sample of 116 egos.
Similar to the demographics of the egos, the gender ratio of these 548 alters is considered balanced
(male=55.3 per cent; female=44.7 per cent). Most of these alters were reported to have completed
Bachelor’s degrees (71.5 per cent), followed by Master’s (10.2 per cent), Diploma (9.1 per cent), under
Diploma (6.0 per cent), and Ph.D. (3.1 per cent). A majority of them falls into the age range of 18–25
years old (58.2 per cent), followed by 26–35 (24.8 per cent), 36–45 (6.8 per cent), and the rest.

4.2 Social roles and interactions of information security influential sources
The information about the alters and their social roles to the egos help to answer research question 1. As
explained in the research method section, our questionnaire directly asked the egos to identify
maximum seven people who can influence their information security behaviours as well as social roles,
thus allows the collection of this information. As seen in table 1, the most prevalent role that can
influence one’s information security behaviours is “friends”, which accounts for 51.09 per cent (280
alters) in total. The second influential relationship role that influences our young Internet users are
colleagues (14.78 per cent), followed by family (14.60 per cent). Surprisingly, there are more
acquaintances nominated as being influential (7.12 per cent) than partners such as lovers and spouses
(6.57 per cent), relatives (3.28 per cent), and seniors at work (2.55 per cent).
Table 1: Social roles of alters to egos
Social roles of alters to egos
Friends
Colleagues
Family
Acquaintances
Partners
Relatives
Seniors

# of alters
280
81
80
39
36
18
14

%
51.09
14.78
14.60
7.12
6.57
3.28
2.55

One potential reason that explains the influential statuses of these relationship roles could be due to the
young Internet users in our sample spend more time to interact with their friends, as compared to other
roles. Given that interaction plays a key role in interpersonal influences, such as via direct persuasion
and indirect comparison (Leenders 2002), the level of interaction with a relationship role can determine
how influential that role is. Since the mean age is 23.84 years old, there is also a high chance that these
young Internet users do not work, hence receive less interaction and influence from professional roles
such as colleagues and seniors.
To answer research question 2, we examine the interactions between the egos and alters. This
information is summarised in table 2 below, and the interactions are categorised according to the types
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of influential power (French and Raven 1959; Raven 2008) that they carry. Amongst the types of security
supports or interactions that the egos receive, “Expert” is the most prevalent power which consists of
people who can explain (296 alters) and teach information security matters (236 alters) to the egos.
Consequently, each ego has access to a fair amount of people whom they consider knowledgeable in
information security (204 alters). Moreover, the number of experts who can troubleshoot the ego’s
security issues (170 alters) is fewer than other types of experts.
Table 2: Security interactions from alters to egos
Power
Expert

Legitimate

Reward
Coercive

Security interactions from alters to egos
Can explain security threats to ego
Can teach ego security matters
Are considered knowledgeable in security by ego
Can troubleshoot ego’s security issues
Have access to ego’s data
Share confidential data with ego
Are victims of cyber-attacks before
Deserve protection by ego
Recognise ego’s security effort
Can reward ego for security effort
Impose social sanction on ego’s security negligence
Can punish ego for neglecting security effort

# of alters
296
236
204
170
80
103
272
299
228
67
195
65

%
54.01
43.07
37.23
31.02
14.60
18.80
49.64
54.56
41.61
12.23
35.58
11.86

Alters with “Legitimate” power are people whose social positions impact the ego’s decisions to perform
information security behaviours. In details, Raven (2008) explained that “legitimate” alters are
influential thanks to the power recognised by social norm, the obligation of the ego to return a favour to
the alter, or their dependence on the ego due to factors such as powerlessness. In our context, having
access to the ego’s confidential data or co-sharing data with the ego could grant the legitimate power
that urges the ego to pay more attention to information security. Similarly, alters who are previous victim
of cyber-attacks and deserve security protection by the ego for any reasons would be influential as well.
Amongst the different types of “Legitimate” power, many alters were identified by egos as deserving
their protection by default (299 alters) and being victim of cyber-attacks (272 alters). Some were
nominated as sharing confidential data with the egos (103 alters) and having access to their data (80
alters).
Finally, “Reward” and “Coercive” power types rely on incentives and punishment to motivate behaviours
(French and Raven 1959; Raven 2008). Consistent with the original theory, we categorised each of these
power types into two sub-types, including the incentives and punishment that are tangible (e.g.
monetary) and intangible (e.g. social recognition). Interestingly, the number of alters that can influence
security by providing social recognition (228 alters) and sanction (195 alters) is higher than tangible
reward (67 alters) and punishment (65 alters).
Our next analysis aims to determine the associations between the relationship roles and the types of
interactions that result in security influence. One way to evaluate the associations between two variables
is by computing their Jaccard distance, which is based on the co-occurrence of the variables across alters.
The formula to calculate Jaccard distance is as followed:
𝑑𝑗 𝐴, 𝐵 = 1 −

𝐴∩𝐵
𝐴∪𝐵

with A and B as two specific types of relationships about social roles or influential power. As the two
types of relationships co-occur more, the numerator (i.e. the union of A and B) increases and thus makes
the distance smaller. The use of Jaccard distances is a simple yet effective method for similarity
comparison especially for network data (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The Jaccard distances of the
relationships are summarised in table 3.
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Table 3: Jaccard distances between relationships (1: Explain threats; 2: Teach security; 3: Reward;
4: Recognition; 5: Punish; 6: Social sanction; 7: Victim; 8: Knowledgeable; 9: Share data; 10:
Access data; 11: Need protection; 12: Troubleshoot)–smaller value means more association
Partner
Family
Relative
Colleague
Senior
Friend
Acquaintance

(1)
0.93
0.87
0.96
0.87
0.97
0.64
0.95

(2)
0.92
0.9
0.96
0.86
0.97
0.7
0.94

(3)
0.98
0.88
0.95
0.9
0.97
0.93
0.95

(4)
0.95
0.86
0.97
0.9
0.97
0.69
0.94

(5)
0.94
0.96
0.96
0.88
0.93
0.92
0.97

(6)
0.91
0.9
0.96
0.86
0.97
0.75
0.97

(7)
0.93
0.86
0.98
0.86
0.98
0.69
0.93

(8)
0.94
0.91
0.97
0.82
0.98
0.74
0.94

(9)
0.86
0.86
0.95
0.91
0.96
0.9
0.99

(10)
0.8
0.9
0.96
0.89
0.98
0.93
0.98

(11)
0.92
0.82
0.96
0.84
0.97
0.7
0.96

(12)
0.93
0.91
0.96
0.83
0.97
0.79
0.97

The values in table 3 are coloured dark blues as they get smaller, whereas dark red values indicate a
longer Jaccard distance (i.e. fewer co-occurrence) between two relationships. It may be tempting to
interpret from the results that alters who are relatives, seniors, and acquaintances, are least capable of
exerting influential power since they have the most number of red-coloured cells. Nevertheless, this is
due to the numbers of relatives, seniors, and acquaintances nominated by the egos are smaller than
other social roles (refer to table 1). The results in table 3 are therefore better used for understanding
which influential power (columns) is most prevalent to a social role (rows). For this reason, it is
important to take note that the cells in table 3 were also coloured according to their values as compared
to those in the same row rather than across rows. As a result, a value of 0.8 may have a dark blue colour
if it is the lowest in a certain row, but the same value of 0.8 may be coloured red if it is higher than the
average in other rows.
Alters who are “partners” often have access to the ego’s confidential data as well as co-share data with
the ego. Such interactions were anticipated since sharing and accessing confidential data require a
certain level of trust between people who are in an intimate relationship. Most alters who are “family
members” were identified as deserving protection, while some can explain security, recognise or reward
the ego’s security efforts, and are victim of security incidents before. This result is consistent with prior
studies about security behaviours in home context, where the HCUs’ considerations about protecting
the household network are commonly taken into account (Dang et al. 2013; Li and Siponen 2011).
“Colleagues” were most recognised as knowledgeable in information security and being able to
troubleshoot security issues and need the ego’s protection. The most prominent influence that comes
from “seniors” is tangible punishment on ego’s security negligence. These interactions are
understandable as colleagues could often be recognised as possessing professional expertise and have
knowledge of the ego’s work, thus were perceived as capable of providing relevant support. On the other
hand, senior staff have formal authority which enables them to sanction the egos’ negligence (Raven
2008). As consistent with the large number of nominations received, alters who are “friends” of egos are
capable to exert many types of power, with notable ones include the ability to explain security threats,
recognise ego’s security efforts, and being victim of cyber-attacks. Last but not least, some
“acquaintances” were recognised as knowledgeable in information security and victim of security
attacks, as well as capable of teaching information security and recognising the ego’s security efforts.

5 DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Discussion
Throughout our analysis, we have answered the two research questions stated in the introduction
section. In particular, the young HCUs in our sample have their information security behaviours
primarily influenced by their friends, followed by close relationships such as partners and family
members. Interestingly, colleagues at work were found to influence these Internet users more than their
relatives. We believe the time they spend with the alters on a regular basis governs whether an alter with
a social role would be able to influence the ego’s information security behaviours. For these young
Internet users who are currently attending universities and working in entry/junior positions, it can be
expected that their main sources of interactions would normally comprise friends who are fellow
students and colleagues, and family members and partners who are outside of school and work life.
Despite being a significant issue (Howe et al. 2012), there is a lack of recent studies that identify the
sources of security information or influence, especially in non-Western contexts. For instance, Aytes and
Connolly (2004) surveyed 167 undergraduate students, of which 47 per cent reported not having any
sources that can provide them information related to safe security practices. Amongst those who had
information sources to seek advice from, 52 per cent of these sources are friends and co-workers.
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Similarly, 41 per cent of 415 HCUs in the UK, who participated in a security awareness survey, reported
to receive security advice from friends or relatives, followed by public websites (43 per cent), and IT
professionals (Furnell et al. 2007). Our findings extracted from the Vietnamese/Asian sample extend
prior results that friend-alters not only give security advice but also influence positively the HCUs’
security behaviours. We further clarified that there were only a few relatives nominated for being
influential, as compared to other close social roles such as family members and partners. Ng and Rahim
(2005) empirically tested a security-related model, which was based on the Decomposed Theory of
Planned Behaviour. They found that family and peers, as well as mass media, have positive effects on
subjective norms that subsequently affected HCUs’ intention to practice security. In this aspect, our
findings mirror Ng and Rahim's (2005) empirical results.
Amongst the power bases discussed in French and Raven's (1959) theory, we detected a large number of
alters who hold “Expert” power types and were nominated as influential towards the ego’s information
security behaviours. Since information security is still widely recognised by the end-users as a technical
area (Dang-Pham et al. 2014), those who can explain and teach information security appear more
convincing than others. Moreover, interactions such as delegating security responsibilities and seeking
security advice from knowledgeable colleagues have been documented by prior studies in the workplace
context (Dang-Pham et al. 2014; Dourish et al. 2004; Kirlappos et al. 2014; Warkentin et al. 2011). Our
result supports this finding in personal or home context.
We found actors having access to others’ data and co-sharing data with them can make these actors more
influential in information security. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found in their seminal study that
psychological ownership over the Internet and own computer can motivate HCUs to perform security
behaviours. Since ownership plays an important role in motivating security practices, those who share
such ownership over the HCUs’ confidential data can be reasonably expected to hold influential power.
Furthermore, being recognised as a victim of prior security attacks was also suggested to make a person
more influential to the others’ security behaviours. Since past experience and consequences are
confirmed stimuli of HCUs’ information security behaviours (Howe et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2008), they
would also consider these stimuli when assessing the potential influencers.
Rewards and punishment are common incentives that can modify beliefs and behaviours (Raven 2008).
Moreover, social recognition and sanctions were nominated to have influential power towards our
sample of young HCUs. Social sanction has been confirmed as a consistent deterrence of security
violations, and in other cases, a motivation of security compliance (Sommestad et al. 2014). As a majority
of security influential alters were nominated as capable of delivering social sanction on the ego’s security
negligence, our finding is consistent with prior studies in this aspect. In contrast, while existing research
found that tangible sanctions can influence workplace’s security behaviours as the employees realise the
sanctions’ severity and certainty (Sommestad et al. 2014), the alters nominated by the HCU-egos in our
study were not reported to exert much of that influential power.
Tangible rewards for security efforts have been mentioned in research about organisational security
management as a tactic to motivate compliance (Siponen et al. 2014), despite its empirical results were
found to vary across work contexts (e.g. Dang et al. 2013; Sommestad et al. 2014; Vance et al. 2012). Our
finding continues to support its influential role in the personal context, despite being ranked lower than
social recognition. While intangible rewards such as peer’s appreciation were not confirmed as a
contributing factor of information security behaviours in the work context (Siponen et al. 2014), a
number of our young HCUs identified being recognised as a reason why their information security
behaviours are influenced by the people whom they interact with.

5.2 Implications
Having discussed and compared our findings with prior research, we found numerous practical and
theoretical implications. First, we employed the ego-centric network analysis approach to analyse the
interactions amongst HCUs rather than their individualistic attributes, as traditionally done by existing
studies. This approach allows us to explore the different types of social roles and interactions that
influence the HCUs’ security behaviours, as well as determine their associations. As a consequence,
future research investigating the effect of subjective norms may consider specifying the salient roles that
can influence security behaviours, such as friends, family members, or partners, instead of asking
generic questions that refer to important persons in general.
Furthermore, we encourage innovative uses of ego-network research approach to analyse the impacts of
structural features on individual’s security behaviours. For instance, the interrelationships between an
ego’s alters or neighbours (e.g. are friends to each other or co-share data) might put extra pressure on
the ego to continuously exercise and learn security practices. This could be the ego’s effort to create a
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good image to their alters who know each other, or to increase the protection when the data is co-shared
by many people. We have also collected but not yet analysed weighted relational data about the intensity
of the interactions between egos and alters, such as frequency of communication, trustworthiness of
security advice, and level of influence that each alter has on the egos. Network regression techniques can
be applied in the next steps to predict the alters’ influential statuses based on their social roles and
security interactions. Gaining such understanding would further determine the specific salient social
roles and interactions that influence end-users’ security behaviours.
From a practical point of view, our findings contribute to intervention that aims to improve HCUs’
security awareness and behaviours, especially by specifying the sources of security influence and the
interactions that enable such influence. This would allow more effective investment of resources in the
catalysts that can influence HCUs’ security behaviours. From what we found about social recognition
and sanctions being interactions that influence security behaviours, performing information security
appears to have developed into a practice that yields social status. Educational institutions can promote
the positive image of being proficient at information security to encourage learning and teaching security
practices. Security influence was found to come from friends, family members, and partners, who not
only spend more time with the young HCUs in daily life but can also provide them relevant and discreet
advice about dealing with personal information security issues. Institutions can design and implement
security awareness programs that involve the participation of people who hold those social roles, so to
enhance the programs’ positive influence over HCUs’ security behaviours.

6 CONCLUSION
The sample of our study primarily consists of young HCUs in Vietnam, South East Asia. This
subsequently limits our findings’ generalisability to the samples similar to ours. It would be beneficial
to conduct a survey that aims to cover a larger population, especially across cultural contexts for
comparison purposes. Given the rapid Internet penetration and the increasing number of cyber-attacks
that threaten organisations directly and indirectly, HCUs’ information security behaviours and
awareness must not be neglected (Anderson and Agarwal 2010; Dinev et al. 2009; Liang and Xue 2010).
Nevertheless, educating and influencing HCUs’ security behaviours are challenging due to the lack of
professional support and infrastructure, as compared to the formal workplaces (Dang et al. 2013; Li and
Siponen 2011).
Our exploratory study contributes to the intervention that aims to enhance HCUs’ security practices,
particularly by identifying the influential sources and their interactions that can influence HCUs’
security behaviours. Gaining understanding of these sources and interactions would enable more
efficient and effective targeted intervention. Furthermore, we demonstrated the empirical use of the egocentric network research method, as a part of the social network analysis methodology, which has not
yet been applied in behavioural security studies (Dang-Pham et al. 2014). As consistent with the
suggested theoretical implications, we hope to stimulate novel ideas about using network analysis
methods and encourage their adoption in the behavioural security field.
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